

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 00249 01 OF 02 280008Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----066893 280019Z /65

O P 271957Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7481  
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL CAPETOWN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUSAKA 0249

EXDIS

CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PDEV RH US UK  
SUBJ: RHODESIA: A VIEW FROM LUSAKA ON THE EVE OF THE MALTA  
CONFERENCE

1. WE HAVE AN IMPRESSION IN LUSAKA THAT THERE HAS BEEN A  
PERCEPTIBLE SHIFT IN OPINION AMONG MANY AFRICANS DURING THE  
LAST TWO MONTHS WITH REGARD TO THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE VARIOUS  
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE.  
PRIOR TO DECEMBER THERE WERE ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVE PATHS TOWARDS  
A SOLUTION IN RHODESIA: MILITARY ACTION OR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LUSAKA 00249 01 OF 02 280008Z

PROPOSAL. SINCE IT APPEARED THAT THE INEVITABLE COURSE OF  
HISTORY SUPPORTED AN EVENTUAL AFRICAN VICTORY AND THAT THE ARMED  
STRUGGLE WAS PRODUCING RESULTS, MANY SAW LITTLE REASON TO  
COMPROMISE OR CONCEDE ANYTHING IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A  
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION THROUGH OUR PROPOSAL. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN  
ATTEMPT TO MEDIATE THE PROBLEM APPEALED ONLY TO THE MOST MODER-  
ATE WHO WISHED TO AVOID BLOODSHED AND MAINTAIN A POST-INDEPEND-

ENCE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WHICH WAS NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESENT ONE.

2. THE INITIATION OF THE INTERNAL TALKS IN SALISBURY, HOWEVER, RAISED A NEW, THIRD, ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION. WITH SMITH'S ACCEPTANCE OF ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE AT AGE 18, MAJORITY RULE IS NEAR AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW NATION RUN BY A BLACK GOVERNMENT, DEFENDED BY A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK ARMY, AND BACKED BY WHITE RHODESIANS AND SOUTH AFRICA HAS EMERGED; A NATION WHICH COULD BE A FORMIDABLE OPPONENT BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY. A MILITARY CHALLENGE TO SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNIST SUPPORT AND WOULD INVOLVE FIGHTING THAT WOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO RHODESIA. WE NOTE IN OUR CONTACTS WITH AFRICANS, LIKE THE NIGERIAN AND GHANAIA HIGH COMMISSIONERS HERE IN LUSAKA, AND IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ZAMBIANS AND WITH OTHER FRONTLINE LEADERS LIKE MACHEL, AN AWARENESS OF THE SPECTER WHICH SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE PRESENTS FOR THIS PART OF AFRICA.

3. MANY ZAMBIANS, REACTING TO THE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY, HAVE IN MIND THAT, THOUGH THEY WERE WILLING TO SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICAN MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE IN RHODESIA, THERE IS A LIMIT TO HOW FAR THEY WOULD SACRIFICE THEIR OWN COUNTRY IN ORDER TO ASSURE JOSHUA NKOMO POWER IN ZIMBABWE. WE BELIEVE KAUNDA IS AWARE OF THIS AND THAT HE RECOGNIZES THAT HE CANNOT PUSH SUPPORT FOR NKOMO TOO FAR WITHOUT THREATENING HIS OWN POSITION.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LUSAKA 00249 01 OF 02 280008Z

4. THUS WE BELIEVE THAT MORE AFRICANS ARE BEGINNING TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR INITIATIVE AS THE ONLY PRESENT ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND THEY ARE BECOMING MORE ANXIOUS THAT WE CARRY ON WITH OUR PROPOSAL THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST. OUR LEVERAGE HAS INCREASED.

5. THE PF RECOGNIZES THIS AND UNDERSTANDS THAT IT MUST BE SEEN TO BE TALKING WITH US SERIOUSLY OR IT WOULD LOSE AFRICAN SUPPORT. WE FRANKLY DOUBT WHETHER IT IS YET PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ITS BASIC INSISTENCE THAT IT BE THE ONLY AFRICAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION TO BE GIVEN OFFICIAL STATUS AND RESPONSIBILITY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. WE DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL BE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT AT MALTA OR AFTERWARDS UNLESS IT IS ABSOLUTELY FORCED TO DO SO BY ITS SUPPORTERS-- NIGERIA AND THE FRONTLINE.

6. THE BRITISH MAY BE EQUIVOCAL ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SALISBURY TALKS BUT THERE IS FORTUNATELY NO MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL AND PARTICULARLY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF AUTHORITY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. WE BOTH AGREE THAT THOUGH WE ARE WILLING TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT

TO ASSURE THE PF OF THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS AND  
ASSOCIATE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE  
DURING THE TRANSITION, ULTIMATE AUTHORITY MUST REST WITH THE  
BRITISH AND LORD CARVER MUST HAVE ADEQUATE POWER TO GOVERN  
EFFECTIVELY AND MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. NEITHER OF US IS OF  
A MIND TO GRANT THE PF'S DEMANDS FOR A DOMINANT ROLE DURING  
THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

7. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SOME VALUE TO MAKING THIS POINT  
CLEARER PUBLICLY THAN WE HAVE TO DATE. IF MALTA IS NOT  
SUCCESSFUL, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE REASON IS THAT THE  
PF WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS; THAT IT INSISTED UPON AN EXCLUSIVE  
POSITION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. WE BELIEVE THAT MANY  
AFRICANS WOULD LOSE SYMPATHY WITH THE PF IF IT WAS PUBLICLY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LUSAKA 00249 01 OF 02 280008Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 00249 02 OF 02 272358Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----066589 280020Z /65

O P 271957Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7482  
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL CAPETOWN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LUSAKA 0249

EXDIS

SEEN TO BE DEMANDING POWER RATHER THAN MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE. A LITTLE PRESS BACKGROUNDING BEFORE THE CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WOULD INSIST UPON IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS AND RESIST DOMINATION BY ANY GROUP WOULD ANGER THE PF BUT IT WOULD REASSURE MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE AND IT WOULD FOCUS THE REAL ISSUE OF THE CONFERENCE TO THE WATCHING WORLD. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ESTABLISH FROM THE BEGINNING THAT IF THE CONFERENCE IS NOT SUCCESSFUL, THIS IS THE REASON, AND TO MAKE SURE THE MEDIA UNDERSTANDS THIS POINT.

8. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE BRITISH THAT FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE WE WOULD PUBLISH OUR PROPOSAL IN ITS FINAL ELABORATED STATE. THIS WILL NOT SATISFY THE PF BUT IT COULD STRENGTHEN AND ENCOURAGE SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA WHEN THEY SAW THAT WE DID NOT BUCKLE TO PF PRESSURE TO DOMINATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LUSAKA 00249 02 OF 02 272358Z

THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE CRUCIAL POINT OF COURSE IS WHAT THE FL AND NIGERIAN ATTITUDE WOULD BE. IF WE PRESENTED OUR PLAN TO THEM ON THE BASIS THAT THIS IS OUR STUDIED VIEW OF THE MOST PRACTICAL AND FAIREST PROPOSAL WHICH WE COULD MAKE AND ASKED FOR THEIR ENDORSEMENT, WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE FACED WITH A DIFFICULT CHOICE. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ENDORSE THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE INCREASED BY OUR SUCCESS IN DEMONSTRATING THAT THE PF'S OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSAL WAS BASED ON ITS INSISTENCE ON DOMINATING THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND ON FL CONFIDENCE THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR IT COULD RESULT IN SMITH'S DEPARTURE. IN SEEKING SUCH ENDORSEMENT OF THE FL, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WITHOUT THEIR PUBLIC SUPPORT, WE SEE NO WAY THAT WE CAN OBTAIN SMITH'S DEPARTURE. INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO SMITH'S EFFORTS IN SALISBURY WOULD ALSO BE WEAKENED, AS WOULD BE DOMESTIC FORCES IN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE BRITISH WOULD BE VERY HESITANT TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS BECAUSE THEY INSIST THEY NEED PF ACQUIESCENCE IN ORDER FOR SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS TO EXIST INSIDE RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. HOWEVER, IF WE COULD GO TO SOUTH AFRICA AND THEN SMITH WITH FL BACKING IN THE FACE OF PF RESISTANCE, WE ARE THEN NOT SO FAR FROM WHAT SMITH HIMSELF IS TALKING ABOUT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED.

7. IF THE FL FAILS TO GIVE US WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE ADEQUATE ENDORSEMENT, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS THEY WHO HAVE REJECTED OUR PROPOSAL RATHER THAN WE WHO HAVE LOST HEART OR CHANGED OUR MINDS. WHATEVER POSITION WE DECIDE ON WITH REGARD TO THE SALISBURY INTERNAL SOLUTION MIGHT THEN BE EASIER TO ASSUME.  
LOW

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 27 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978LUSAKA00249  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780041-0919  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** LUSAKA  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780115/aaaaalzl.tel  
**Line Count:** 222  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 27b070df-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** ONLY  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** ONLY  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3702149  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** RHODESIA: A VIEW FROM LUSAKA ON THE EVE OF THE MALTA CONFERENCE  
**TAGS:** PDEV, RH, US, UK  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/27b070df-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014